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In this conceptual paper I contend that the soul of academic labour is becoming lost in 
performativity. Performativity, I explain, is a form of regulation and control that deploys 
technical rationality and judgements to incentivise and punish academics. Indeed, 
performativity is central to the culture of measurement within contemporary universities. This 
I contend is demoralizing academic labour as performativity only measures and values those 
dimensions of academic labour that can be captured by quantitative performance indicators.  
  To critique this process I firstly locate performativity within a moral economy perspective. I 
argue that the university economy is no longer structured by the moral norm of education as a 
public good. It is has been restructured, commodified and marketized by neo-liberal 
capitalism. Secondly, I explore how the reorganization of institutional practices and academic 
identity within the university by performativity wreaks terror in the academic’s soul. Thirdly, 
I critique the unsatisfying post-structural reduction of the soul to a synonym for subjectivity 
and offer a sociological conception of the soul as the spiritual dimension of academic labour 
emerging from deep, rich social relations of production. My conjecture is that the soul is the 
moral energy and purpose central to species-being: the peculiarly human ability to transform 
the socio-human world for the good of all. Finally, I suggest that within the soulless technical 
measure of academic labour that now dominates the university lies the possibility for 
developing a more soulful normative measure. My aim then is to articulate a dialectical 
humanist conception of the soul of academic labour in order to critique the reductive 
positivism of the measured university. 
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Lost Souls? The De-moralization of Academic Labour in the Measured University 
 
 
Introduction: The de-moralized economy of the measured university 
 
Moral economy studies the moral norms and sentiments that structure and 
influence economic practices, both formal and informal, and the way in which 
these are reinforced, shaped, compromised or overridden by economic pressures. 
(Sayer 2007 p. 262) 
 
 
In their discussion piece Against academic identity, Neary & Winn (2016) argue that interest 
in academic identity is a reflection of a wider concern with the nature of academic labour. 
They declare that the concept “fails to deal with real nature of work in capitalist society” 
(Neary & Winn, 2016, p. 409). In addition they argue that dominance of post-structural 
conceptions of identity that celebrate difference – gender, ethnic, sexual etc. – has led to an 
accommodation with, rather than the overthrow of capitalism, the real cause of the 
subordination of labour. Hence the concept of academic identity should be “abolished. I share 
Neary & Winn’s position on the subordination of academic labour by capitalism and the 
deleterious effects of post-structuralist conceptions of identity. However, rather than seeking 
to abolish the concept of identity I want to work “in-against and beyond” it (Holloway 2012).  
   To achieve this end I conceptualise academic labour as an expression of what Marx (1997) 
called “species-being”: the peculiarly human ability to transform both the socio-human world 
and ourselves for the good of all. Furthermore, I speculate that species-being has a moral 
dimension: it is an expression of the human soul. In addition I conceptualise the soul as the  
“moral energy” that gives purpose and value to social labour (Marx, 1997, p. 81).Thus, unlike 
Neary and Winn’s political economy, I seek to explore an aspect of the moral economy of 
academic labour and identity.  
  Twenty five years ago, whilst researching a labour history, I came upon the Marxist-
humanist historian E.P. Thompson’s classic essay, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd 
in the Eighteenth Century. In this work, Thompson analysed the effects of the reorganisation 
of the economy by the new ideology of laissez-faire capitalism; a form of capitalism that was 
“disinfested of moral imperative” (Thompson, 1971, p. 90). Thompson was particularly 
interested in the way that the market for bread that had previously been structured by popular 
cultural notions of fairness and reciprocity, became demoralized through the institution of the 
free market principle of supply and demand. As I was researching this paper, it struck me that 
there are strong resonances between Thompson’s analysis and the marketization of Higher 
Education in late twentieth and early twenty-first century. In England, the Higher Education 
economy is no longer structured by the norms and values of academic culture committed to 
education as a public good. It is has been reorganized by the ideology of neo-liberal 
capitalism. The university economy is now structured by the principle of supply and demand 
and the cost-benefit calculus.  Academic labour is now performed in a culture of 
measurement (Biesta 2010).   
  In the measurement culture of education questions concerning the nature and purpose of a 
good education have been displaced by technical and managerial questions concerning 
efficiency and effectiveness. The university economy is dominated by the measurement of 
process rather than moral purpose. The normative has been displaced by the performative: 
 
The rise of a culture of performativity in education – a culture in which means 




mistaken for quality itself – has been one of the main drivers of an approach to 
measurement in which normative validity is being replaced by technical validity 
(Biesta, 2010, p. 13). 
 
Using Biesta’s work I argue that performativity measures only that which can be easily 
measured quantitatively. This has resulted in universities valuing only quantitative indicators 
of economic effectiveness and efficiency. For example, performativity neither measures nor 
values what is central to academic labour: love (Sutton 2016a).  Love defined as a “syndrome 
of attitudes; that of care, responsibility, respect and knowledge” (Fromm, 1962, p. 33); as a 
feeling of connectedness with others; is a vital dimension of the deep, rich social relations 
that are necessary for the emergence of soul in academic labour. Furthermore, love is also a 
vital dimension of a humane moral economy. This paper then is an endeavour to reclaim the 
soul of academic labour that is becoming lost in performativity.  
   I now explore Ball’s conception of performativity. Thereafter, I explore the contention that 
the soul is an emergent property of both human cognition and deep and rich social relations. 
Building upon this the soul is conjectured to be part of human species-being. Finally, I 
suggest that the possibility exists for a soulful normative measure of academic labour to be 




My interest lies in how the technology of performativity, within an increasingly marketized 
Higher Education system (Brown & Carasso 2013), has overridden the moral purpose I 
believe to be central to academic labour: education as a public rather than a private good. 
Performativity is a quintessential dimension of the measured university. In order to critique 
performativity I will use the work of the educational sociologist Stephen J. Ball. The rationale 
for using Ball’s (2003, 2012a & 2012b) work is that his work clearly and comprehensively 
addresses the perils of measurement culture in education. In addition Ball introduces the 
notion of the teacher’s soul into the performativity debate.  However, Ball (2003) only 
appears to explore the “terror” wreaked upon the “teacher’s soul” by performativity. He never 
defines what soul is but simply uses the work of Foucault, in which the soul is a synonym for 
the psyche, subjectivity, personality, or consciousness. In Ball’s post-structuralist account, 
the soul is engendered by “methods of punishment, supervision and constraint” (Foucault, 
1979, p. 29); it is the medium and effect of power-knowledge relations. Thus the soul is a 
product of disciplinary power. Ball’s account, like many Foucauldian accounts of power, is 
too negative. I will negate this negation by offering a more positive account of the soul as 
engendered by deep and rich human social relations (see below). But before addressing the 
emergence of the soul from the social relations of production, it is necessary to define 
performativity and explore how performativity demoralises both the institutional practices of 
universities and academic labour. 
  Performativity is a form of rationality and regulation that deploys technical judgements and 
comparisons to measure, incentivise and punish academics. In performativity academic 
productivity is measured by largely quantitative performance indicators. For Ball, 
performativity, in tandem with the market and managerialism, is an educational policy 
technology that is neo-liberalising Higher Education. This triad is changing both the nature of 
academic labour and identity. Ball (2012a p.31) offers a Foucauldian definition of 
performativity as “the quintessential form of neo-liberal governmentality, which encompasses 
subjectivity, institutional practices, economy and government.”  In this paper I am mainly 
concerned with the manifestation of neo-liberal governmentality in institutional practices of 





The re-ordering of institutional practices 
Performativity is a “framework of judgement” through which the efficiency and productivity 
of academic labour is measured (Ball, 2012a, p.31). Pivotal to the operation of performativity 
is “the translation of complex social processes and events into simple figures or categories of 
judgement.” (Ball, 2003, p. 217). What is lost in this translation, I argue, is the quality of the 
complex and dynamic relationships that constitute the moral economy of academic labour. 
Social relationships with colleagues and students, the fulcrum of academic productivity, are 
reduced to de-humanised performance indicators. Performative categories of judgement are 
characterised by a binary opposition of quantity and quality with quality being the 
subordinate term. Hence, performative judgements are largely made on the basis of simplistic 
quantitative measures of productivity reducing the complex human processes of academic 
labour to simplified targets and outcome measures. For example, institutional quality 
assurance measures consisting of standardised bureaucratic institutional reviews and key 
performance Indicators. Thus, the techniques of Personal Development Review, Academic 
Development Planning etc., operate to individualize and demoralize social labour by 
privileging quantitative measures of academic labour over the quality of that labour.  
 The neo-liberalising university positions academics as ‘active agents seeking to maximise 
their own advantage’; as individuals who are responsible for “calculating actions and 
outcomes” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 198). Success at work requires each individual academic 
labourer to perpetually calculate and choose: for choice is a central tenet of neo-liberalism. 
Each individual is thereby “governed through their freedom to choose” (Rose & Miller, 1992, 
p. 201). Choice is part of the regulatory technology of governmentality. The Foucauldian 
concept of governmentality can be defined as the “internal control systems” that attempt to 
“re-order the collective and individual selves that make up organizational life” (Power, 1999, 
p. 42). I will pursue the re-ordering of the self in more detail below. 
  The internal control systems of universities are structured by the principles of cost 
effectiveness, economic efficiency and quality assurance. Performativity then is a way of 
making institutional and individual performance auditable through the collection of mainly 
quantitative forms of information. Universities have been “colonized by an audit process 
which disseminates and implants the values that underlie and support its information 
demands” (Power, 1999, p. 95). The effect of these informational demands is twofold. First, it 
re-channels academic labour “towards those activities that can be easily measured, especially 
as performance outcomes” (Ball, 2012a, p. 32). In this way the more complex and difficult to 
measure “social, emotional and moral” dimensions that are central to the soul of academic 
labour, but have no immediate measurable “performative value”, tend to be effaced  (Ball, 
2012a, p. 32). Concrete labour is thereby displaced by abstract labour, use value by exchange 
value.
i
 Thus, the experience of academic labour becomes “inauthentic and alienating”, a 
commodified relationship characterised by “active docility and depthless productivity”, in 
which “commitment is sacrificed for impression.” (Ball, 2012a, p. 31, 32). Second, 
performativity changes the way in which academics “experience their work and the 
satisfactions they get from it” (Ball, 2012a, p. 32). For example, the complex social 
relationship between teacher and student is transmogrified into a simple service relationship 
in which the customer is always right.  Furthermore, and what is highly significant for this 
discussion, academics “sense of moral purpose” is also devalued by a “new episteme of 
public service” in which academic labour is restructured as form of self-interested 
entrepreneurialism (Ball, 2012b, p. 20). Academics are increasingly being urged to become 
highly visible entrepreneurs competing to sell their goods and services in the higher 






The re-ordering of self-identity 
Performativity not only re-orders institutional practices it also re-orders self-identity. One of 
the ways in which this is accomplished is through the institutionalization of the logic of 
standardization: regulations and systems replace academic judgement and discretion. As 
stated above, this changes the experience of being an academic and tends to produce “new 
mentalities, new incentives and perceptions of significance … a new organizational actor” 
(Power, 1999, p. 97). The creation of this new organizational actor takes place when the 
technology of performativity becomes internalised: when academics come to want what is 
wanted from them. Thus, performativity works to align academics “moral sense” and desires 
with institutional demands (Ball, 2012a, p. 31). 
  Increasingly, universities demand that academics are in constant state of becoming 
(perpetual professional development review), continually working upon themselves to 
improve their economic effectiveness and efficiency. Performativity also induces guilt and 
inadequacy if academics do not (Beg & Seeber 2013). The collegial academic subject is 
being displaced by the individual neo-liberal subject acting to maximise their economic value 
within the academic quasi-market (Canaan 2010, Billot 2010). The ensemble of the social 
relations of production from which academic identity emerges is increasingly de-moralized 
through the institution of individualised market based contractual relations.   
  Thus, academic values and commitments are replaced by contractual duties. Performativity 
creates neo-liberal subjects that are “malleable rather than committed, flexible rather than 
principled – essentially depthless.” (Ball, 2012a, p. 31). The technology of performativity, in 
conjunction with marketization and managerialism, leaves little or no space for a “shared 
moral language” or “an autonomous or collective ethical self” (Ball 2003 p. 226) necessary, I 
argue, for the emergence of soul.  
  Performativity leads to a form of demoralisation through the “commodification of the public 
professional” (Ball, 2012a, p. 32). This process of commodification has changed the system 
of rewards and sanctions in higher education and the form and content of teaching and 
research. The success of academic performance is no longer measured by academic but 
commercial values. For example, numbers of students recruited, engagement with employers 
and other stakeholders, and income generation (Naidoo 2005).The power effect of being 
constantly measured by quantitative managerial criteria, that tend to be in a constant state of 
flux due to ever changing market demands, leads to “ontological insecurity” (Ball, 2003, p. 
220). Academics become increasingly unsure as to whether they are “doing enough, doing 
the right thing, doing as much as others, or as well as others, constantly looking to improve” 
(Ball, 2003, p. 220). This creates high levels of stress around resource allocation, 
communication, and control of the labour process (Tytherleigh et al 2005). At best this has 
produced “uneasy academic subjectivities” (Acker & Weber 2016), and at worst this has 
wreaked terror upon the academic’s soul.  However, as I observed above, Ball (2003) never 
adequately defines what soul is. I will address this lacuna by offering a sociological 




The nature and emergence of the soul 
The Greek term soul is commonly translated as psyche a noun derived from the verb psychein 
which means to breathe or “that which generates and constitutes the essential life of a being” 
(Goetz & Taliaferro, 2011, p. 7). My interest in the ontological dimension of academic labour 
and how performativity is asphyxiating academic being has prompted this paper. I want to 




constitutive power of authentic academic labour. Furthermore, I want to think about the 
generative energy of the human soul by using a Marxist Humanist theoretical framework. For 
at the heart of Marxism lies an especial emphasis on human creativity and self-creation 
(Williams 1977).
ii
 Indeed, when reading the early Marx one is struck by the pivotal role 
ascribed to creativity in social life. Creativity is what makes us human: creativity is at the 
centre of our species-being. It is the peculiar human ability to transform both the socio-
human world and ourselves. I develop this ontological dimension of Humanist Marxism by 
exploring the possibility that the soul is an integral dimension of species-being that emerges 
from within the “ensemble of social relations” (Marx, 1997, p. 402). To explain this 
contention, I draw on an essay by Brown (1998) which provides a very useful way to begin 
theorising the conditions of possibility for the emergence of soul. 
  Brown (1998, p. 100) argues that the soul signifies a “unique human capacity and 
experience”, associated with the exercise of agency, self-consciousness, love and 
transcendence. Soulfulness is a moral relatedness to self, others and God. In my social 
ontology of the soul, God is displaced by society, or more properly sociality (society as 
dialectical process). It is sociality, and specifically the social relations of production, that 
reaches deeply into the essence of our human being. Brown (1998) continues by arguing that 
the soul is an emergent property of “deep, rich experiences of personal relatedness”, which in 
turn are “an emergent property of certain critical cognitive abilities” (Brown, 1998, p. 102). 
  I understand deep rich personal relatedness as relationships that are founded upon love 
(care, responsibility, respect and knowledge), in which social interdependence is both 
acknowledged and valued. Deep rich personal relatedness then involves taking responsibility 
for both ourselves and others and positioning others as an end in themselves, rather than a 
means to an end. Such relationships generate a sense of identity and belonging (Whyte 2001), 
a sense of ontological security. Such relationships are rooted in community or collegiality 
rather than contract. The depthless nature of academic labour engendered by performativity is 
obviously anathema to the depth required for the emergence of soul. 
  Brown argues that an emergent property is made possible by an increase in the capacity of 
lower level abilities and their interactions. The soul’s “emergenesis” depends upon, but is not 
reducible to those properties. In sum, “human experiences of soul are conditioned by but 
cannot be reduced to the underlying mental processes from which they emerge.” (Brown, 
1998, p. 103) Soul therefore, is something different from mind or consciousness. 
  Next Brown (1998) identifies six interdependent critical cognitive capacities that enable the 
emergence of soul: language, memory, and future orientation, a theory of mind, emotional 
modulation, and agency, Language is the uniquely human capacity to communicate and 
understand complex abstract ideas and emotional states. This “makes possible important 
dimensions of personal relatedness that could not exist independent of language” (Brown, 
1998, p. 107). Social communication through language is a necessary condition for deep 
personal relatedness.  
  In Marxist Humanism, language is conceptualized as “practical consciousness” which arises 
from the need to produce “material life itself” – food, clothing, and shelter etc. (Marx, 1979, 
p.  421, 419). Language emerges from the human need to communicate with others in social 
labour and this requires cooperative social relationships with other people However, I further 
extend Marx’s conceptualization to argue that language is not only practical but spiritual, and 
that the spiritual and the practical are both necessary dimensions of the production of the 
conditions necessary for life to flourish. Therefore, a shared moral language is a necessary 
dimension of the social relations of production from which the soul emerges. Furthermore, 
language is an essential dimension of the process of human self-creation (Williams 1977) is 




  Language in turn is necessary for another critical cognitive capacity: episodic or 
autobiographical memory. Autobiographical memory creates a historical and continuous store 
of memories of events, places and people (Brown 1998). It connects the past with the present 
and is crucial for the development of both a stable identity and personal relatedness. 
Language combined with memory enables the construction of stocks of collectively 
accessible knowledge and understanding needed to direct future thinking, being and doing 
(Harvey 2000). Brown (1998) calls this the ability to imagine possible futures. I call it the 
utopian imaginary and, drawing on Freire and Bloch I argue that this is central not only to my 
own academic identity but also to the emancipatory purpose of Higher Education (Sutton 
2015).  
  Language and memory also enable the development of another crucial cognitive ability: a 
theory of mind. This is the capacity to recognise the thoughts and feelings of self and other. I 
would add that such recognition facilitates compassion which for me is the essence of any 
moral economy. A theory of mind makes possible “emotional modulation”: the “complex 
social and contextual cognition” that enables people to make appropriate emotional responses 
and decisions (Brown, 1998, 103). This ability is vital for the creation and maintenance of 
personal relatedness. The final critical cognitive ability essential for the emergenesis of the 
soul is “conscious top-down agency” (Brown, 1998, p. 117). Humans do not simply react to 
stimuli, our behaviour is not simply the product of conditioning, but rather is the product of 
agency. Therefore, the emergence of soul requires a significant degree of freedom to exercise, 
what Marx (1997, p. 294) terms “will and consciousness”. 
  In sum, the complex interaction of these six critical cognitive powers and capacities create 
the conditions necessary for the deep and rich social relatedness from which the soul 
emerges. However, what is not fully acknowledged in Brown’s emergenesis theory are the 
material conditions and social relations of production necessary for the evolution of critical 
cognitive powers. As Marx (1997) argues, human as a species needed to organize labour 
collectively in order to survive. This defines their ‘species-being’. I now explore the concept 
of species-being and argue that the soul is an integral dimension thereof.   
 
 
Species-being and the spiritual dimension of social labour 
Species-being is a value-laden concept used by Marx to understand the peculiarities of the 
human condition. It is a “normative” rather than a simply descriptive concept of social being 
(Markovic, 1974, p. 53). Species-being signifies the human ability to “transform the world 
through labour and thereby transform ourselves” (Harvey, 2000, p. 206). What is often not 
made explicit in accounts of species-being is that it is the ability to transform self and society 
for the good of all. But what is species-being? Species-being is constituted through a 
“combination of self-consciousness, material capacity, and collective organisation” (Dyer-
Witherford, 2004, p. 5). It therefore signifies that there are mental, material and mutual 
dimensions to the human condition. However I would go further and add there is an essential 
metaphysical dimension to the human condition:  the soul. 
  Marx developed the concept of species-being as a critique of alienation: what he saw as 
capitalism’s appropriation of the human ability to transform self and other through social 
labour. In the 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts the concept of species-being 
emerges from Marx’s discussion of alienated labour. After discussing the alienation of the 
worker from the product of labour, and from the production process, Marx then discusses the 
emergence of self-alienation. The discussion begins with the introduction of the concept of 
species-being. Species-being is the power to “practically and theoretically” make “life 
activity itself into an object of will and consciousness.” (Marx, 1997, p. 293, 294). Note the 




requires both “moral energy” (Marx, 1997, p.381) and moral purpose: it requires soul. 
Building on this idea, Kosik (1975) refers to human survival as the ‘spiritual-practical’ 
production and reproduction of the reality through social labour.
iii
  It is my contention that the 
spiritual dimension of labour is often overlooked in Marxist theory. Furthermore, I speculate 
that the term spiritual can be fruitfully interpreted as connoting the soul, and that the soul is 
an essential dimension of the collective creation of the socio-human world. 
  Marx did not use the term soul but he did use the term spiritual.
iv
 He wrote of “the physical 
and the spiritual life” of human beings and of the “physical” and “spiritual energy” used by 
workers in the labour process (Marx, 1997, p.  293). Marx’s (1997, p. 295) discussion of 
alienation continues stating that under capitalism, the labourer’s loss of control over the 
process of production and the product of their labour engenders a self-alienation in which 
human ‘spiritual nature’ is lost. Capitalist relations of production abstract the individual from 
their collective species-being and in that abstraction the connection that the labourer 
experiences to work is lost. Thereby the spiritual dimension of labour disappears. Labour is 
reduced to the means to satisfy the needs of individual physical existence. It ceases to be 
creative, ceases to be “free conscious activity …life begetting life”, and becomes “alienated 
externalized labour” (Marx, 1997, p. 294, 296). In the measured university the de-
moralization of academic labour under performativity creates a similar spiritual alienation in 
which the soul is lost. 
  The capitalist social relations of production that create alienation from the product and 
process, from self and spirit also creates alienation from other humans (Marx 1997). This 
results in the commodification of species-being. So too in contemporary neo-liberalizing 
universities species-being is commodified. Performativity, managerialism and the market 
result in the loss of the deep rich social relations which create and sustain the soul. For me, 
performativity is not only a reductive epistemology or mode of knowing and measuring 
academic labour, it is also a reductive ontology in which academics are alienated from the 
spiritual dimension of their species-being. Performativity is a form of positivism in which the 
unity of the practical and the spiritual in human labour is ruptured.  
  The antithesis to this reductive positivism can be found in a dialectical humanist approach 
that restores the complexity and interrelatedness of the spiritual and the practical.
v
 The soul 
emerges from their dynamic interplay in academic labour. Dialectics is a way of 
understanding and explaining academic labour as part of the “dialectical whole”.  It is a 
theoretical method that proceeds “from the whole to its parts and from the parts to the whole, 
from phenomena to essence and from essence to phenomena” (Kosik, 1976, p. 18, 23). This 
dialectical conception captures the complexity of the social relations of academic labour that 
is lost in the positivism of performativity. 
  In sum, the soul is part of the human essence, part of species-being that emerges from deep, 
rich human relationships. Soul emerges from human consciousness and will, and provides 
both the moral energy and purpose central to soulful academic labour. Soulful academic 
labour is premised upon “a moral obligation to students and colleagues, regardless of the 
direct or indirect career benefits” (Macfarlane, 2005, p. 172). But how might the soulfulness 




Towards a dialectical measure of academic labour  
… alienation could not even be seen, and condemned of robbing people of their 
freedom and depriving the world of its soul, if there did not exist some measure 
of its opposite, of that possible coming-to-oneself ... (Bloch, 1964, cited in 





It is my view that the measurement of academic labour is a given, it has become embedded in 
the institutional practices of universities. The measured university is here to stay. 
Nevertheless, I think it is possible for the dominance of technical performative measures to 
be challenged by normative measures concerned with moral purpose. The alienation caused 
by severing the relationship between the practical and the spiritual dimensions of academic 
labour can be overcome. For in the “paradoxical logic” of dialectical humanism opposites are 
interrelated (Fromm, 1962, p.120). What does this mean? This means that within the 
performative quantitative measure of academic labour resides its normative qualitative 
opposite. What Biesta (2010, p. 13) refers to as “quality itself”, rather than the targets and 
indicators of quality. Thus, although the meaning of quality is denoted and measured 
quantitatively, an opposite qualitative connotative meaning of quality is contained within 
performativity, albeit in a subordinated form. This opposite meaning provides an opening 
within the language of measurement for the transformation of quantity into quality. This 
dialectical process is called development through contradiction or negation. Furthermore, a 
dialectical measurement of academic labour would consist of both quantitative and 
qualitative measurements, and possess both technical and the normative validity. 
  It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a fully developed normative model for the 
measurement of soul in academic labour. However, a possible starting point for such a model 
is to be found in The New Economics Foundation (2014) Dynamic Model of Well-Being at 
Work. The New Economics Foundation uses an array of qualitative indicators to measure the 
hedonic, eudaimonic and evaluative dimensions of labour. The hedonic dimension measures 
academics’ level of engagement with their work, how worthwhile it is considered to be and 
how happy or anxious they feel. The eudaimonic dimension measures academics’ sense of 
meaning and moral purpose in their work, opportunities for creativity, a sense of 
achievement, and autonomy. The autonomy so central to soulful academic labour signifies 
“the ability to select tasks and research projects; time and space for thinking and research; the 
opportunity to engage in socially useful critique; and self- management within disciplinary 
departments” (Robinson, 2016, p. 27). The evaluative indicator measures overall job 
satisfaction. Thus the hedonic, eudaimonic and evaluative measures are a fruitful place to 
begin the quest to measure soul. Adapting the well-being at work model to this end could act 
as the antithesis of performativity: a dialectical negation of the negation that re-valorises the 
moral dimensions of academic labour. 
 
Conclusion 
… even the driest of his [Marx’s] descriptions contain an implicit moral 
connotation. (Markovic, 1974, p. 59) 
  
Like Neary & Winn (2016), my aim has been to understand alienated academic labour and 
identity in order that they may be transformed. However, I offer a different kind of Marxist 
analysis, one that foregrounds the need for a moral as well as a political economy of 
academic labour. In my analysis I have worked in-against-and-beyond academic labour and 
identity through an exploration of the moral connotations of the concept of species-being. I 
argued that academic labour is an expression of human species-being. That the  soulful 
dimension of species-being emerges from deep, rich social relations of production that are an 
essential dimension of the creative spiritual-practical reproduction of social life. I also 
speculated that the soul, conceptualised as moral energy and purpose, is an essential 
dimension of that species-being 
  However, the regime of performativity that dominates the measured university I argued is a 




capture the soul of academic labour. This results in demoralization. The soulfulness central to 
the social relations of academic production and the moral economy of the university as a 
public good are not measured and thereby are not valued in performativity. A re-valorisation 
of the moral purpose at the heart of higher education is therefore necessary.  
  This re-valorisation may be achieved through a dialectical humanist analysis. By positing a 
dynamic interrelationship between the technical and the normative, the quantitative and the 
qualitative the limitations of performative measurement may be transcended. A qualitative 
normative measure of academic labour based upon the NEF dynamic model of well-being at 
work, I suggest, provides a starting point for the development of new moral economy of 
academic labour. For it is only by re-uniting the spiritual and the practical measurements of 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
i
  For a detailed discussion of the Marxian concepts of abstract and concrete labour and the associated concepts 
of use and exchange value see Sutton (2016b) 
 
ii
  See also Markovic (1974 p. 73-74) who states that: 
‘One of the most distinctive characteristics of man (sic) is his creativity. In contrast to all other living beings 
man constantly evolves his tools, his methods of work, his needs, his objectives, his criteria of evaluation.’ Part 
of the purpose of this paper is to begin to explore the possibilities of alternatives to performative criteria of the 
evaluation of academic labour. 
 
iii
  On the dialectical nature of cognition in Marxist Humanism see Kosik (1976) Chapter 1. 
 
iv
 In Bottomore’s popular translation of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (Fromm 2011), the term 
‘spiritual’ is translated as ‘mental’. Yet in Kosik (1976) and Marx (1997) translated by Easton & Guddat the 
term spiritual is used. This does raise interesting questions concerning the politics of interpretation. In my 
endeavor to put the metaphysical back into Marxism I find the latter translation more sympathetic. 
 
v
  Kosik (1976) defines dialectics as a form of critical thinking that attempts to understand and explain the 
human being’s place in the universe by penetrating beneath surface appearances to the essence of phenomena. 
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